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Abstract  
The September 11th attacks impacted society generally, and law enforcement specifically, in 
dramatic ways.  One of the major trends has been changing expectations regarding criminal 
intelligence practices among state, local, and tribal (SLT) law enforcement agencies, and the 
need to coordinate intelligence efforts and share information at all levels of government.  In fact, 
enhancing intelligence efforts has emerged as a critical issue for the prevention of all threats and 
crimes.   To date, an increasing number of SLT law enforcement agencies have expanded their 
intelligence capacity and there have been fundamental changes in the national, state, and local 
information sharing infrastructure.  Moreover, critical to these expanding information sharing 
expectations is the institutionalization of fusion centers.  Despite these dramatic changes, an 
expanding role, and the acknowledgement that local law enforcement intelligence is critical to 
the prevention and deterrence of threats and crimes, very little research exists that highlights 
issues related to the intelligence practices of SLT law enforcement agencies and fusion centers.1  
This research describes what agencies are doing to build an intelligence capacity and assesses the 
state of information sharing among agencies.  Specifically, a national survey was developed to 
examine the experiences of SLT agencies and fusion centers for building an intelligence capacity 
as well as to understand critical gaps in the sharing of information regarding intelligence.  
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Law Enforcement’s Information Sharing Infrastructure: A National Assessment2 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This research describes what U.S. law enforcement agencies are doing to build an 
intelligence capacity and assesses the state of information sharing among agencies.  Specifically, 
a national survey was developed to examine the experiences of state, local, and tribal (SLT) law 
enforcement agencies and fusion centers for building an intelligence capacity as well as to 
understand critical gaps in the sharing of information regarding intelligence.  Although the 
federal government has provided support to build an intelligence infrastructure to more 
effectively respond to terrorism, there has been virtually no empirical work that describes the 
major issues and obstacles faced by SLT law enforcement agencies and fusion centers on 
intelligence-related issues.  More specifically, this study seeks to explore the working 
relationships among law enforcement and other organizations, law enforcement’s awareness of 
threats and key mandates to prevent or mitigate those threats, and their operational knowledge of 
the emerging intelligence-led policing philosophy.  This study is a critical first step in 
documenting the status of the progress made accomplishing key intelligence goals, and we 
believe this study contributes to the knowledge of and literature pertaining to law enforcement 
intelligence practices in the United States.     
 
RELEVANT LITERATURE 
                                                 
2 This research was sponsored by grant award number 2008-IJ-CX-0007 from the National Institute of Justice, US 
Department of Justice.  Points of view or opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily 
represent the official position of the National Institute of Justice or the US Department of Justice. 
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 This research draws upon two primary fields of theory to guide the present study.  First, 
as commonplace within discussions of police innovation, a brief discussion of organizational 
change will be presented to provide context.  Law enforcement intelligence is the current 
innovation among American police agencies and the philosophy by which police implement 
these practices is through intelligence-led policing.  Second, as the primary focus of this research 
is to present a national snapshot of law enforcement intelligence practices in the U.S. as they 
demonstrate a movement toward the adoption of this innovation, an in-depth discussion of 
contemporary intelligence mandates and research is provided.   
 
ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION FRAMEWORK 
Intelligence-led policing shares a similar conceptual foundation to community policing in 
that the relationship between the two philosophies is based on the use of community policing as a 
mechanism that enhances intelligence-led policing via two-way information flow between police 
and the community (Carter & Carter, 2009).  Such a foundation is helpful when exploring the 
adoption of law enforcement intelligence practices in the United States as policing scholars have 
established a solid literature on the impact of innovations on police organizations and the manner 
in which they are adopted (King, 1998, 2000; Morabito, 2010; Weisburd & Braga, 2006).  This 
collective knowledge helps to inform the present study by providing a theoretical understanding 
of what is to be discussed.  It should be noted that despite common similarities, community and 
intelligence-led policing are different philosophies designed to achieve different results.   
Community policing is largely focused within the specific jurisdiction of the law enforcement 
agency and emphasizes community partnerships, organizational decentralization, and a problem 
solving orientation.  Whereas intelligence-led policing may also emphasize “within jurisdiction” 
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crime problems, the focus of ILP tends to shift to regional, national and even transnational risks 
and threats.  Whereas community policing emphasizes community input into determining 
localized priorities, ILP seeks community input in terms of tips and leads and seeks to integrate 
or fuse such intelligence with other sources of information about emerging threats.  Advocates of 
both community policing and intelligence led policing have called for organizational 
transformation to institutionalize these innovations, though the history of community policing 
has suggested such organizational change has been difficult to achieve (Greene, 2004).     
Consistent with institutional systems theory and organizational learning is the ambiguity 
of what adoption actually constitutes.  Institutional theory posits police agencies will label 
themselves as being innovative and consistent with emerging practiceslargely independent of 
actual organizational change.  This phenomenon is consistently examined in the community 
policing literature (Crank, 1994; Wilson, 2006; Wilson & Kelling, 1982).  Many agencies 
indicate they have adopted community policing and are actively engaged in the appropriate 
practices.  However when their practices and programs are examined more closely it becomes 
apparent that community policing in the agency is often “window dressing” and an attempt to 
regain legitimacy in the eyes of their peers and those they serve (Crank, 2003; Greene, 2004).  
Intelligence-led policing is predicted to follow similar patterns.  Indeed, Burress, Giblin and 
Schafer’s (2010: 95) study of homeland security practices in Illinois found that “Institutional 
pressures, such as professional and government publications, training, professional associations, 
and the actions of peer agencies, significantly influenced municipal and county agencies.”  
Indeed, these forces were much more predictive than levels of funding to support these practices.  
Similarly, Giblin’s (2006) study of the adoption of crime analysis found that while contingency 
factors such as population played a role, institutional factors such as accreditation were more 
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predictive of the adoption than were demand factors such as crime rates.  Thus, intelligence-led 
policing is expected to follow a similar path with respect to ambiguous adoptions, varying 
implementation, and “window dressing” applications (Chappell, 2009).  Similarly, organizational 
learning theorists posit that organizations often mistake talking about change for change actually 
occurring (Pfeffer & Sutton, 2000).  To begin, it must be established that intelligence-led 
policing constitutes an innovation among American police agencies.  In an effort to demonstrate 
the extent to which agencies are engaged in intelligence-led policing, the present study assesses 
the extent to which law enforcement is engaged in law enforcement intelligences practices and 
their perception of these practices.   
 
INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING AS INNOVATION 
 Literature on police innovation has leaned on the standard requirement that an innovation 
must be “state-of-the-art” (King, 2000).  How policing scholars have gone about ascertaining if a 
program or technology was “state-of-the-art” is somewhat ambiguous and inconsistent.  Methods 
used by scholars to identify police innovations thus far have included reviews of scholarly 
literature (Zhao et al., 1995), law enforcement panel interviews (Spelman et al., 1992), and 
surveys (King, 1998; Moore et al., 1996).  Other scholars have broadly labeled innovation as 
something new for the policing agency, but without explaining how or why the innovations were 
actually “new” (Mullen, 1996; Weiss, 1997).  Intelligence-led policing can be categorized as an 
innovation by following similar steps.   
Much of the literature related to the emergence of intelligence-led policing falls within 
the homeland security arena.  Authors typically merge the two concepts, taking the position that 
intelligence-led policing is a function of homeland security (Oliver, 2006, 2009; Schafer et al., 
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2009).  Such a position is correct, but this is true for many facets of law enforcement and 
preparedness with the litany of homeland security responsibilities as tasked by the federal 
government.  As such, it is more appropriate to focus on literature and recommendations specific 
to intelligence-led policing to solidify the “state-of-the-art” of the concept.  In March 2002, more 
than 120 criminal intelligence experts from across the U.S. gathered for an “Intelligence 
Summit” hosted by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP).  At this summit, 
law enforcement professionals expressed frustration in the lack of guidance from the government 
as to how intelligence-led policing should be defined and put into practice.  Specifically, one of 
the core recommendations was to “promote intelligence-led policing through a common 
understanding of criminal intelligence and its usefulness” (International Association of Chiefs of 
Police, 2002:v).  Ratcliffe (2005) reaffirmed this frustration among police practitioners in New 
Zealand that while very excited about the potential benefits of the intelligence-led philosophy, 
found it difficult to adopt as a result of a lack of consistent understanding of the new concept.  As 
a result, the Global Intelligence Working Group was created and their first product was the 
National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP) that stated “all agencies, regardless of 
size, must have a minimal criminal intelligence sharing capability” (Global Intelligence Working 
Group, 2003:iii).   
Enhancing the utility of intelligence-led policing was the creation of fusion centers.  
There are currently 72 official fusion centers in the U.S. (Carter et al., 2012) to increase the 
exchange of information and data across government and private sectors to enhance law 
enforcement’s ability to fight crime and terrorism and prevent threats (Global Intelligence 
Working Group, 2005; McGarrell et al., 2007).  The relationship between intelligence-led 
policing and fusion centers is reinforced by the Office of Homeland Security’s National Strategy 
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for Homeland Security that identifies the philosophy as one of the primary tools to combat 
terrorism and threats to the U.S (Homeland Security Council, 2007).  Fusion centers increase the 
production and sharing of crime and intelligence analysis products.  Manning (2001) suggested 
that crime analysis is a step in the right direction for policing, but that it lacks the actual analytic 
component to inform decision making – intelligence-led policing serves as the vehicle by which 
informed decision making can result from the utilization of analytic products.  Ratcliffe (2002) 
went on to note that intelligence-led policing is a new tactic relying on crime analysis that can 
rapidly improve police processes and management.  Lastly, academics (Carter and Carter, 2009; 
Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008; Scheider et al., 2009) and practitioners (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 
2005; Guidetti & Martinelli, 2009) alike agree that intelligence-led policing is not only new to 
policing, but so new in fact that it requires a shift in police management, organizational structure, 
and even day-to-day operations.  Furthermore, Scheider et al (2009) specifically identified 
intelligence-led policing as an innovation within policing and that while it is new to law 
enforcement, the lessons learned from previous policing innovations are critical to successful 
adoption.    
As mentioned, the NCISP was created by the Global Intelligence Working Group 
(GIWG) to provide law enforcement agencies with the necessary resources to develop, gather, 
access, receive, and share intelligence.  To this end, the plan established a number of national 
standards that have been formally recognized by the professional law enforcement community as 
the proper role and processes for the contemporary application of law enforcement intelligence 
(Carter, 2009).  Within the NCISP was the formal call for American law enforcement agencies to 
adopt intelligence-led policing.  However, this recommendation lacked guidance for adopting 
this new philosophy and evaluating progress.  This lack of guidance without some basic idea of 
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how intelligence is being integrated into law enforcement agencies and the mechanisms by 
which these agencies share information inhibits researchers from exploring the intelligence-led 
policing philosophy.  A successful intelligence-led philosophy can be determined through the 
effectiveness of state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies’ ability to collect, analyze, 
disseminate, and integrate intelligence into the operations of the organization.   
A challenge exists in that there are differing views of the intelligence-led policing 
concept and its application, yet there remains a movement toward the adoption of intelligence-
led policing without a universally accepted definition or operational philosophy (Bureau of 
Justice Assistance, 2010).  Intelligence-led policing, like community policing, must be tailored to 
the characteristics of each individual agency.  As such, the approach must be created through an 
inclusive development process that ensures it is in concert with an agency’s goals and functions, 
its capabilities, and the characteristics of both the agency and the jurisdiction it serves.  Like all 
police innovations and change, obstacles will be prevalent with this philosophical shift 
(Weisburd et al., 1993).  While there is no universally accepted definition of intelligence-led 
policing, the following definition perhaps best illustrates the conceptualization of the philosophy: 
“The collection and analysis of information related to crime and conditions that 
contribute to crime, resulting in an actionable intelligence product intended to aid law 
enforcement in developing tactical responses to threats and/or strategic planning related 
to emerging or changing threats (Carter & Carter, 2009, p.317).” 
 As mentioned, intelligence-led policing shares a similar struggle that community-policing 
encountered in the early 1990s.  There was such a high degree of ambiguity as to what 
community policing actually was that agencies were not sure how to integrate it within the 
existing policing function.  This is largely a result of such a wide variance with respect to the 
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needs and priorities of American law enforcement agencies.  As such, new innovations will be 
adopted differently across police organizations with acceptable degrees of variance (Greenberg 
et al., 2001).  Simply put, organizations are structured different, have different responsibilities, 
and different demands – therefore the manner in which they adopt new programs should vary 
due to these differences.  While the NCISP states all agencies, regardless of size, must have an 
intelligence-led policing capability, there is no common denominator as to what an intelligence-
led policing capability constitutes for agencies of different size and responsibility.  Moreover, 
there is very little research as to how agencies of different sizes have attempted to respond to this 
requirement.  The survey results presented here begin to fill this gap.   
Intuition might assume that larger policy agencies should have a more comprehensive 
intelligence capacity than smaller agencies.  In contrast to this assumption, agency size has not 
been found to help explain law enforcement intelligence practices (Carter, 2011).  An agency’s 
intelligence-led policing capability need only be as advanced as the responsibilities that agency 
requires.  The New York Police Department will have a significantly different intelligence-led 
policing capability than that of a rural department with less than five sworn officers.  While this 
is a crude example, it serves to point out the fundamental difference.  Rather than being fixated 
on the label “intelligence-led policing”, practitioners and academics alike need to be concerned 
first with understanding with the intelligence practices that our occurring within agencies and 
how the greater law enforcement intelligence landscape is evolving.   In short, there is a pressing 
concern for research which begins to establish what intelligence-related practices law 
enforcement has implemented to give an accurate reflection of adoption.  
 
LAW ENFORCEMENT INTELLIGENCE 
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 Since the terrorist attacks of September 11th, there has been a considerable investment of 
resources in many different government sectors to better prepare, respond, and recover from 
terrorist attacks.  One critical investment area has been in improving the law enforcement 
intelligence capacity at all levels of government.  Following the September 11th attacks, and 
more specifically following the March 2002 International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) 
and Office for Community-Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Intelligence Summit, it was 
recognized that to provide an effective and comprehensive barrier to future terrorist attacks, law 
enforcement agencies had to re-engineer their current intelligence capacity and, in many cases, 
they had to build an intelligence capacity from the ground up.  The concept and application of 
law enforcement intelligence was beginning a metamorphosis at that time, driven by new 
concepts and standards, initiated largely by the Global Intelligence Working Group (GIWG) and 
the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council (CICC).2  New resources and training 
opportunities were becoming available and change was occurring comparatively fast.  Among 
the challenges were that agencies were having difficulty implementing the changes, both 
conceptually and from a staffing perspective.  In addition, the number of Joint Terrorism Task 
Forces (JTTF) has increased dramatically since 9/11 which, even though they are primarily 
investigative bodies, utilize the products of the intelligence process as well as aid in collecting 
information that meets intelligence requirements.   
The development of state and major urban area fusion centers has also had a significant 
effect on intelligence production and information sharing (Cooney, Rojek & Kaminski, 2011).  
While the 72 officially recognized fusion centers are under the control of their respective state or 
local jurisdiction, they comply with federal standards, serve as a clearinghouse of information for 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and generally provide opportunities for federal, 
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state, and local law enforcement to share and disseminate information about terrorism, criminal 
threats, and natural disasters.  Furthermore, DHS identified minimal standards for law 
enforcement and fusion centers to engage in information sharing for the prevention of threats in 
the Target Capabilities List (U. S. Department of Homeland Security, 2007). This list of minimal 
capabilities serves as another key guideline by which SLT law enforcement agencies are to 
successfully engage in information sharing for prevention efforts. Finally, the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevent Act of 2004 mandates that the President establish an Information 
Sharing Environment (ISE).  The implementation plan for this ISE, which was released in 
November 2006, states that:  
“This environment will create a powerful national capability to share, search, and analyze 
terrorism information across jurisdictional boundaries and provide a distributed, secure, 
and trusted environment for transforming data into actionable information. The resulting 
environment will also recognize and leverage the vital roles played by State and major 
urban area information fusion centers, which represent crucial investments toward 
improving the nation’s counterterrorism capacity” (p. xiv).   
While there has been a significant void in empirical research that attempts to examine 
issues related to information sharing among law enforcement agencies, there is some work that 
has examined fusion centers specifically or the links between fusion centers and individual 
departments in a particular state (see Cooney et al. 2011; Graphia-Joyal 2010; Ratcliffe & 
Walden 2010; Saari, 2010).   There is also some work that provides a general understanding of 
intelligence issues, but there is little work that is national in focus.      
First, the Government Accountability Office (2003) reviewed critical documents related 
to information sharing, interviewed officials from various agencies, and surveyed 29 federal law 
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enforcement agencies, all 50 homeland security offices, all cities with a population of 100,000 or 
greater (N=485), and a random sample of smaller cities (N=242).  The surveys were sent to the 
mayor who either completed the survey or delegated the completion to the chief of police, an 
assistant, or other emergency management personnel.   There were many important findings 
highlighted in this report, but several concern information sharing limitations.  Among these 
findings were that:  
1) Officials from federal, state, and local governments do not think the process of sharing 
information is “effective” or “very effective;”  
2) They do not routinely receive the information they need to protect the homeland;  
3) The information received is not timely;  
4) Opportunities are routinely missed to obtain and provide information to the federal 
government; and  
5) Law enforcement agencies are not receiving the types of information they need to 
effectively prevent terrorist attacks.   
Importantly, it should be noted that when these data were collected in 2003 when virtually none 
of the currently available information sharing tools were in place, including fusion centers.   
The RAND Corporation has conducted two national surveys related to domestic 
preparedness and intelligence (Riley & Hoffman, 1995; Riley, Treverton, Wilson, & Davis, 
2005).  The 1995 survey focused on preparedness issues for state and local law enforcement.  
The important conclusion of the study was that there was very little intelligence and strategic 
assessment capability and poor information sharing between federal and state law enforcement 
officials – findings that mirrored those of the more widely noted report published in 2004 by the 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission Report).  
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Of course, the significant changes that were produced in the post-9/11 era, largely under GIWG 
leadership, were intended to address these problems.   
Prior to the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, RAND did a second 
survey and several case studies to examine issues related to local and state intelligence efforts.  
This study concluded that SLT law enforcement agencies have played an increasingly important 
role in responding to and preventing terrorism.  Law enforcement agencies wanted better 
information sharing, needed improvements in communication interoperability, and thought that 
training improvements were necessary (Riley, et al., 2005).  In addition, even small agencies, if 
assessing their threat risk as high, were very proactive in focusing their preparedness efforts. 
Recently, the Homeland Security Policy Institute published a research brief that 
highlighted the results of a survey that was administered to individuals attending the Intelligence 
Unit Commanders Group of the Major Cities Chiefs Association (Cilluffo, Clark & Downing, 
2011).  Forty-two surveys were completed.   Several of the findings highlighted in the research 
brief relate to the issues examined in the study presented here.  First, they found that all 
respondents had a working relationship with their local fusion center, and the respondents 
thought there was value in maintaining that relationship.  This finding is consistent with state-
level research that finds that local law enforcement agencies are generally supportive of fusion 
center activities (Cooney et al., 2011).  Second, the respondents were willing to share 
information through key channels, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) National 
Data Exchange (N-Dex) and the Bureau of Justice Assistance Nationwide Suspicious Activity 
Reporting Initiative (NSI) Program Manager’s Office.  Third, they noted that law enforcement 
preferred to share information locally first, then regionally, and then finally federally.  Fourth, 
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the respondents indicated that their best source of terrorism information was the FBI’s Joint 
Terrorism Task Forces followed by the local fusion centers.   
Another contemporary survey involved over 1,800 law enforcement executives 
(Anarumo, 2011).  This survey found there were strong regional patterns in terms of perceived 
threat groups.  For example, Islamist groups were rated the most feared threat groups by law 
enforcement executives in the northeast, south, and southwest.  However, law enforcement 
executives in the west rated eco-terrorists as the most feared group and right wing groups were 
considered were feared more by executives in the central and southwest regions in comparison to 
other regions.  The findings supported the conclusion that terrorism risk is a local phenomenon 
and that the “identification of the local terrorist threat is the foundation of effective anti-terrorism 
strategy development (2011:76).”  
Although it is generally understood that intelligence must be shared widely, there has 
been very little empirical research that documents what steps law enforcement agencies have 
taken to build an intelligence capacity as well as efforts and obstacles related to information 
sharing.  The studies discussed above provide valuable background information and highlight 
some of the key obstacles in effectively using state and local intelligence.  However, the GAO 
(2003) study does not specifically focus on law enforcement efforts and the RAND studies were 
conducted prior to the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security and before the 
GIWG had issued any of its standards, recommendations or best practices.  The field of 
intelligence has changed incredibly since the RAND study in 2005, and it is important to 
examine current issues specific to law enforcement efforts in the area of intelligence.  
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
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 The research team conducted a national survey of law enforcement intelligence practices 
with two different samples of key personnel.  The first survey sample consisted of state and local 
law enforcement officers and other individuals charged with building an intelligence capacity for 
individual agencies.  The second sample consisted of personnel from state fusion centers that 
have been involved in the development of the intelligence infrastructure in states and major 
urban areas.   
 
SURVEYS OF KEY PERSONNEL 
In order to provide an overview of the major issues facing law enforcement agencies and 
fusion centers, the research team distributed questionnaires via a web-designed survey to two 
groups of law enforcement personnel.  The first group included individuals who had attended a 
national training program funded by the Department of Homeland Security.  Individuals selected 
to attend this training program were typically selected by their agency to lead the efforts to 
develop or re-engineer their agency’s intelligence capacity.  Most had little previous experience 
in law enforcement intelligence and were seeking guidance, through the training, on how to 
develop their agency’s intelligence capacity.  This sampling strategy, which includes personnel 
from significantly different sized police agencies in all geographic regions of the country, was 
chosen for three reasons.  First, in attending this training, these officers were identified by their 
respective SLT agency as a representative of the intelligence function within the agency.  
Second, as a result of their selection on behalf of their agency, this sample includes law 
enforcement personnel who have a working understanding of key issues tied to building an 
intelligence capacity, and thus will be able to address specifically the problems with putting 
knowledge into practice.  Third, their awareness of the contemporary intelligence structures, 
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requirements, and formal communication networks increases the likelihood that they will have 
direct knowledge about the strengths and weaknesses of these issues.   
The second sample group was comprised of persons who attended the 2007 and 2008 
National Fusion Center Conferences (NFCC).  The NFCC is sponsored by the leading law 
enforcement intelligence organizations and is considered to be the prominent gathering of key 
personnel from each fusion center in the United States.3  Attendees of the NFCC include fusion 
center directors, operational personnel, and intelligence analysts.  The research team decided to 
survey the participants at these conferences rather than sending surveys directly to fusion centers 
for two reasons.  First, participants in the conference will not only be fusion center staff 
(including possibly having multiple respondents from the same center), but include others from 
various levels of government and a range of key disciplines.  Thus, the research team assumed 
the sample would include a broad range of individuals critical to effective intelligence practices 
in the United States.  Second, the research team assumed that since most fusion centers would 
send multiple personnel, there would be multiple indicators on key measures for each fusion 
center.   
The intent behind the decision to administer a web-based survey instead of a mail survey 
was to simplify the response process for informants and to reliably capture the data they 
submitted.  A group of state, local, and tribal law enforcement intelligence leaders served as 
subject matter experts and scrutinized preliminary survey drafts. A separate group of law 
enforcement officials then took part in a pretest of both surveys to identify ambiguous or poorly 
worded questions, issues that were overlooked, and items that could be potentially difficult to 
answer correctly.  The final drafts consisted of 103 (law enforcement survey) and 125 (fusion 
center survey) structured, semi-structured, or open-ended questions.  Although the survey 
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instruments were long, the research team opted for breadth and providing opportunities for the 
respondents to engage a variety of critical intelligence issues. In general, the surveys captured 
their intelligence experiences, issues related to information sharing, and strategies that could 
promote better information sharing.  The research team also collected several indicators on the 
type of agency, role of intelligence in the agency, and characteristics of the respondent.   
The surveys were administered using software that is ideal for web-based survey design 
and data collection.  Prior to the data collection phase, it was necessary to ensure no individuals 
appeared in both sampling frames and that addresses we had on file remained valid.  Although 
there was little overlap between the samples, we received a considerable number of automated 
server notifications telling us that the source addresses were no longer valid.  We eliminated that 
addresses from the sampling frame.  In early June 2009 an e-mail was sent to each addressee 
outlining the purpose of the study and inviting them to complete a self-administered online 
questionnaire.  As e-mail replies and survey submissions appeared, the research team readjusted 
the sampling frames so subsequent requests targeted only those who had not communicated with 
us.  Further follow-up e-mails were issued a second, third, and fourth time at approximately 
monthly intervals; the fifth and final reminders were sent at the end of March 2010 and the 
collection window closed a month later.   
After bad addresses were removed from the sampling frame, we sent 2,025 email 
invitations to the law enforcement sample and received 414 replies (20.4% response rate).  A 
portion of these replies were not included in the analysis that follows because a respondent either 
left all survey cells blank or responded with not applicable. Although it was clear in the survey 
letter that we wanted their general impressions about intelligence practices in their organization, 
these respondents were no longer working in an official intelligence capacity and decided to not 
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provide such input.  For the fusion center sample, 772 email invitations were sent, and 96 were 
completed surveys were returned (12.4% response rate).  
 
The response rate was lower than expected.  In order to learn why the response rates were 
not higher, the research team conducted follow-up telephone interviews with 100 randomly 
selected participants from the law enforcement sample.    Among the key reasons that were 
consistently reported for not responding were: 
1. Job responsibilities.  A number of individuals stated that they had been reassigned or 
promoted and no longer worked in the intelligence function.  As a result they either felt 
the survey no longer applied to them or they were not familiar with current activities in 
the intelligence function. 
2. The survey length.  In order to fully explore the nature of and challenges to law 
enforcement intelligence work, both surveys asked respondents more than 100 questions.  
Feedback suggests individuals were uncomfortable committing to this task, especially 
when they were at work.  As one informant remarked, “Thirty minutes is too long, there’s 
no way I have time to take a survey for half an hour – we’re under massive pressure as it 
is.” 
3. One response per agency.  Several individuals declined because they knew a colleague 
from the same agency had already responded.  One person even indicated his work group 
had instituted an informal policy whereby they only respond to one survey per week and 
this task is rotated around the group.  While it is possible to control for a limited number 
of responses when departments are small, it becomes problematic in the case of larger 
organizations and fusion centers. 
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4. Security.  A handful of individuals were concerned about the security implications of 
sharing information about intelligence activities outside of the law enforcement 
community.   
Despite the low response rates, the present study provides value because there has been 
so little research on this topic and thus this study provides some of the first empirical insights 
into several critical intelligence issues.  However, because we are unable to detect the nature of 
the response bias, the results should be accepted with caution and highlight the need for future 
research on this topic.  We discuss the implications of these limitations in more detail in the final 
section.   
We examine four critical issues related to the current state of law enforcement 
intelligence.  First, staff attitudes toward preparedness for terrorist and other types of criminal 
events are examined.  Second, staff knowledge of key intelligence mandates is assessed.  Third, 
the knowledge and understanding of the intelligence-led policing concept is discussed.  Fourth, 
we examine which organizations are relied on for intelligence information and how satisfied 
respondents are with their relationships with these sources.  Where applicable, comparisons are 
drawn from the fusion center respondents to all other law enforcement respondents, as well as by 
the administrator, supervisor, investigator and analysts in state, local, and tribal agencies.   
Table 1 displays descriptive information for the state, local, and tribal law enforcement 
agencies represented in the current study.  The median agency size is 276 total sworn and non-
sworn personnel while the majority of agencies were located in the Midwest region of the United 
States, followed closely by the Southeast and Northwest.  Respondents are mostly investigators 
and administrators who have been employed by their agency for more than 15 years.  The survey 
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instrument did not include a variable to identify jurisdictional responsibility (e.g. county or 
municipal).   
 [ Table 1 approximately here ] 
 
Table 2 displays descriptive information of the fusion centers represented in the current 
study.  The majority (52%) of the fusion centers in the sample consider their center to focus on 
“all-crimes, all-threats, all-hazards” – implying a diverse set of intelligence-related operations 
which go beyond the scope of terrorism.  Most of the fusion centers become operational within 
six years of the study being conducted (66%).  This is not surprising as the formal guidelines to 
establish a fusion center were not published by the U.S. Department of Justice until 2005.  
Administrators and supervisors were the two predominant positions identified by respondents.  
This is to be expected as upper-level management were the personnel selected to represent the 
fusion center at the National Fusion Center Conference.  Lastly, most respondents (41%) 
indicated they had been assigned to their fusion center for one to three years at the time of being 
surveyed.  Given the nature of turn-over within fusion centers as agencies rotate personnel in and 
out on temporary duty assignments, this is not outside the norm.  One might argue that personnel 
who have only been assigned to the fusion center for one to three years may not be cognizant of 
the practices of their respective fusion center.  However, personnel selected to be assigned to the 
fusion center are typically well-versed in law enforcement intelligence operations prior to be 
assigned to the center.   
 
[ Table 2 approximately here ] 
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FINDINGS 
ATTITUDES TOWARD AGENCY PREPAREDNESS 
The awareness of threats for purposes of preventing terrorism and crime is at the heart of 
law enforcement information sharing.  Table 3 provides information about agency preparedness.  
The first two items focused on understanding the threats existing in their region as well as their 
agency’s preparation in responding to these threats.  The results are insightful.   A majority 
(63.5%) of the SLT respondents thought their agencies were either very aware or aware of the 
threats facing their region with little variation when comparing the responses by position within 
the agency (e.g., administrator, supervisor, investigator, and analyst).  In contrast, a significantly 
higher percentage of the fusion center (FC) respondents (over 94 percent) said that they were 
very aware or aware of such threats facing their region. This finding is not surprising given the 
role of fusion centers within the greater law enforcement intelligence landscape.  Designed to 
serve as a lynchpin for information sharing, and more specifically analysis, fusion centers are 
tasked with the responsibility of identifying regional threats and facilitating awareness of 
potential threats to their SLT peers.  As such, it is both expected and welcomed, that fusion 
center respondents indicated being more aware of threats.  Similarly, nearly 43 percent of the 
SLT respondents stated that their agency was very prepared or prepared for the threats in their 
region (an almost equal number stated that they were somewhat prepared), but a significantly 
higher percentage--over 67 percent--of the FC respondents said they were very prepared or 
prepared for homeland security threats.  In addition, when comparing the SLT responses by 
position in the organization, the responding analysts were much more likely to say that the 
organization was very prepared or prepared.  Over 66 percent of the analysts said that the 
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organization was prepared or very prepared compared to 46 percent of administrators, 33 percent 
of supervisors, and 36 percent of investigators.  Thus, although the FC respondents and analysts 
thought that their agencies were prepared for the threats in their region; other SLT personnel did 
not feel as strongly about their agency’s preparation.  
  
[ Table 3 approximately here ] 
 
The results in Table 3 also illustrate that there is widespread agreement that the law 
enforcement community has a long way to go in building an intelligence capacity - a conclusion 
indicated by the respondents from both survey samples.  Less than ten percent of the SLT 
respondents thought their agency was far along in developing and maintaining a law enforcement 
intelligence capacity, 13 percent strongly agreed they had the capacity to identify the 
characteristics of events that represent the indicators or precursors of threats, and only 17 percent 
thought their agency provides actionable intelligence in a timely manner.  Only 15 percent of the 
FC respondents thought they were very far along in developing and maintaining an intelligence 
capacity, 19 percent strongly agreed they had the capacity to identify the characteristics of events 
that represent indicators and/or precursors of threats, and nearly 18 percent strongly agreed that 
the fusion center provides intelligence in a timely manner.  While it is not surprising, very few 
SLT respondents or FC respondents thought they had a sufficient number of staff to achieve their 
organization’s intelligence mission.  Finally, for SLT respondents, less than 17 percent reported 
that FC products provided content to aid in the prevention of crime.  Thus, these responses 
suggest increased awareness and preparedness but with considerable work to do in building law 
enforcement intelligence capability.   
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KNOWLEDGE OF KEY INTELLIGENCE MANDATES 
An organization’s ability to engage in post-9/11 information sharing efforts relies on an 
understanding of contemporary practice.  Such an understanding has been found to increase local 
law enforcement’s homeland security preparedness (Burruss, Giblin, & Schafer, 2010).  Table 4 
presents findings related to knowledge of key intelligence mandates.  The results from this table 
also support the conclusion that building an intelligence capacity for both FCs and SLT agencies 
is a work in progress and very few respondents think their agency has reached optimum 
levels.The state, local, and tribal respondents were very familiar or somewhat familiar with the 
National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (64.8%) and the intelligence-led policing concept 
(70.4%), but they were much less familiar with the Department of Homeland Security’s Target 
Capability List (37.7%).  There was not much variation in the responses to this general 
awareness of these mandates when comparing the different roles of the respondents.  With 70 to 
88 percent responding affirmatively, fusion center respondents were significantly more likely to 
be very or somewhat familiar with the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan, the Target 
Capability List, and the intelligence-led policing concept compared to the SLT respondents.   
 
[Table 4 approximately here ] 
 
It is interesting the respondents agreed that, although they were generally familiar with 
the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan, the Target Capability list, and intelligence-led 
policing, that they have yet to put these mandates into practice.  Only nine percent of the SLT 
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respondents said that their agency’s intelligence function follows the National Criminal 
Intelligence Sharing Plan and just six percent said it aligns with the Target Capability List.  
Nineteen percent of the FC respondents said that their organization’s intelligence function 
followed the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan recommendations and over seven 
percent said that it aligns with the Target Capability List.  
 
INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING 
As discussed, the demand for intelligence-led policing has come from a variety of government 
recommendations, reports, and mandates.  Moreover, government funding has provided 
incentives for agencies to adopt intelligence-led policing to explore its different applications - 
such as the Bureau of Justice Assistance’s “Targeting Violent Crime Initiative” (TVCI). As seen 
in Table 5, very few of the agencies surveyed, however, have implemented intelligence-led 
policing.  On average, only 18.6 percent of the SLT respondents said that their agency had 
adopted intelligence-led policing.  Analysts were somewhat more likely than administrators, 
supervisors, and investigators to believe their organization had adopted ILP.  In contrast, FC 
respondentsindicated their organization had adopted ILP.  Not only did a significantly higher 
percentage of FC respondents indicate their organization had adopted ILP, they were also 
somewhat more likely to believe that it was an effective strategy.  Over 37 percent of the FC 
respondents indicated that ILP would be very effective in their organization.  Although 
investigators and analysts were somewhat more optimistic about the effectiveness of ILP in their 
agency, less than 30 percent of all SLT respondents thought ILP functioned very effectively in 
their agency.   
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[ Table 5 approximately here ] 
 
A recent study of intelligence-led policing implementation found that both familiarity 
with, and commitment to, the ILP concept increased the likelihood of successful implementation 
(Carter, 2011).  The respondents from both surveys indicated that most analysts and other 
personnel in their organization were not familiar with the ILP concept.  Only 14 percent of the 
SLT respondents strongly agreed that analysts were very familiar with the ILP concept and just 
over three percent said that other personnel in the organization were very familiar with this 
concept.  Although the percentages were significantly higher when examining the FC responses, 
just over 28 percent strongly agreed that analysts in the fusion center were familiar and over 18 
percent strongly agreed that other personnel in the organization were familiar with the ILP 
concept.   
Critical to the promotion of this concept are the attitudes of the chief executive about the 
adoption of ILP - without commitment from command staff it is unlikely that ILP will have 
much of an impact on organizational processes.  It appears the FC respondents thought chief 
executives were much more supportive of the ILP concept.  Fifty-one percent of these 
respondents strongly agreed their chief executive supports ILP.  In contrast, just over 23 percent 
of the SLT respondents strongly agreed the chief executive supports ILP.   
 
INFORMATION SHARING 
One of the key elements to the successful use of intelligence for prevention is widespread 
information sharing.  According to the Information Sharing Environment Implementation Plan,  
“Strengthening our nation’s ability to share terrorism information constitutes a cornerstone of our 
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national strategy to protect the American people and our institutions and to defeat terrorists and 
their support networks at home and abroad” (McNamara, 2006: p. xiii).  Similarly, the 
President’s National Strategy for Information Sharing (2007, p. 1) states, “Our success in 
preventing future terrorist attacks depends upon our ability to gather, analyze, and share 
information on intelligence regarding those who want to attack us, the tactics they use, and the 
targets that they intend to attack.”  Organizations and individuals must know how to identify 
relevant threat information, collect it without violating civil liberties, know who the information 
should be shared with, and must be willing to share it.  Although the successful prevention of 
crime and terrorism relies on many organizations sharing information, SLT law enforcement 
agencies play a particularly important role for identifying and intervening in domestic threats.  
Moreover, although state and major urban area fusion centers have provided a vehicle to perhaps 
enhance the flow of local intelligence, these centers are still in development with little 
empirically known about their information sharing relationships with other agencies.  
Considering that information sharing among law enforcement agencies has historically been a 
problematic issue, there is reason to predict that agencies will be less than satisfied with the level 
of information sharing that is occurring.  
 
The Nature of Relationships Among Agencies 
 A willingness on behalf of law enforcement agencies to engage with peer organizations 
has been found to facilitate information sharing (Carter, 2011).  Table 6 provides the results from 
asking about the likelihood respondents would contact various agencies for intelligence and 
threat-related information.  The results are provided for all FC respondents, all SLT respondents 
in general and SLT administrators, supervisors, investigators, and analysts more specifically.  
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Both SLT and FC respondents were similarly likely to heavily rely on others within their own 
agency when having questions about intelligence issues.  Over 66 percent of the SLT 
respondents and over 76 percent of the FC respondents indicated they were very likely to consult 
other staff in their own agency.  Close to or more than half of both the SLT and FC respondents 
were very likely to consult the FBI, state or local law enforcement agencies, and experts in the 
field.  Both SLT and FC respondents were less likely to consult government officials and 
government attorneys.     
The data presented in Table 6 are interesting for two additional reasons.  First, in general, 
similar percentages of SLT and FC respondents were very likely to consult the same sources 
when they have intelligence-related questions, although FC respondents indicated that they were 
very likely to use a few sources more frequently.  For example, a significantly higher percentage 
of FC respondents indicated they were very likely to consult other federal law enforcement 
agencies and  experts in the field.  Only about 29 percent of the SLT respondents were very 
likely to consult other fusion centers on intelligence issues compared to over 61 percent of the 
FC respondents.  Intuitively this makes sense, but it also provides evidence related to the 
structure of intelligence sharing and that fusion centers appear to have open lines of 
communication.  Thus, fusion centers would be expected to, in turn, push any intelligence 
received from other fusion centers throughout their states.  Indeed, this empirically supports the 
rationale on which the development of fusion centers was based.  Second, SLT administrators, 
supervisors, investigators, and analysts appeared to use these sources similarly with just one 
exception.  State, local, and tribal analysts were somewhat less likely to say they would consult 
the FBI on intelligence issues compared to supervisors and investigators and much less likely 
compared to administrators.   
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[ Table 6 approximately here ] 
 
Satisfaction with Relationships 
 The relationships law enforcement organizations have among themselves and other 
community organizations is critical to the success of information sharing.  If relationships are 
poor, or non-existent, active engagement among those organizations that have information and 
those who need it is unlikely to occur.  Table 7 presents the results on respondents’ evaluation of 
their satisfaction with how their agency relates to other agencies.  These results are interesting 
especially when contrasted with the previous findings.  In general, only a modest number of SLT 
and FC respondents were very satisfied with their relationship with the agencies noted and there 
was not much variation when comparing the two groups.  For example, approximately 20 percent 
of SLT and FC respondents were very satisfied with their relationship with the FBI, other federal 
law enforcement agencies, and emergency management personnel.  A somewhat higher 
percentage of both SLT and FC respondents were very satisfied with their relationship with state 
and local law enforcement agencies.  Approximately 28 percent of SLT respondents and 34 
percent of the FC respondents were very satisfied with their relationship with state law 
enforcement agencies, and over 38 percent of the SLT and FC respondents indicated that they 
were very satisfied with their relationship with local law enforcement agencies.  Both SLT and 
FC respondents were not very satisfied with their relationship with tribal law enforcement, public 
health, and private sector agencies, although the low responses might be linked to lack of 
interaction with these agencies rather than specific concerns about these relationships.   
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[ Table 7 approximately here ] 
 
 There was some variation in satisfaction with relationships when comparing across 
positions in the SLT agencies.  For example, supervisors, investigators, and analysts were less 
satisfied with their relationship with the FBI compared to administrators in the sample, and 
supervisors and investigators were less satisfied with their relationship with other federal law 
enforcement compared to administrators and analysts.  Supervisors, investigators, and analysts 
were also less likely to be satisfied with their relationship with local law enforcement, public 
health agencies, and emergency management agencies.   
  
 
DISCUSSION 
The September 11th attacks fundamentally changed the structure, expectations, and 
requirements of law enforcement intelligence operations.  Although there have been significant 
changes and challenges facing the federal law enforcement community, this project focuses on 
what has occurred at state, local, and tribal levels.  The most significant changes have been the 
development of new national standards and initiatives promulgated by the Global Intelligence 
Working Group as well as the widespread development of fusion centers.  Prior to 9/11, law 
enforcement intelligence was largely limited to major city police departments, state police 
agencies and a small number of Regional Intelligence Centers that were sporadically developed 
on a regional basis without any type of national plan or direction.  Most of these intelligence 
units were small, had no national direction and typically did not share much information outside 
of their agency (Carter, 2009).    It is important to note that the present fusion center concept is in 
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contrast to intelligence centers prior to 9/11.  While contemporary fusion centers retain criminal 
intelligence records4 their key purpose is to serve as a clearinghouse to receive and analyze raw 
information and disseminate intelligence products to other law enforcement entities.  This 
philosophical change, combined with the rapid emergence of fusion centers, has created an 
entirely different information sharing infrastructure for the law enforcement community to 
utilize.  This expansion and its impact on local law enforcement is noted in a report recently 
released by DHS documenting progress made towards implementing recommendations from the 
9/11 Commission Report.   
Specifically, it was stated that “While fusion centers did not exist ten years ago, today 
there are 72 recognized fusion centers throughout the country…that are uniquely situated to 
empower front-line law enforcement, public safety, fire service, emergency response, public 
health, critical infrastructure protection, and private sector security personnel to understand local 
implications of national intelligence, thus enabling local officials to better protect their 
communities” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011, p.12).  One of the underlying 
reasons for the creation of these fusion centers was to establish an information sharing 
clearinghouse for state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies as part of the Information 
Sharing Environment.  Such centers were designed to help tear down “silos of information” by 
building trust and communication channels among and between law enforcement agencies, and 
developing nationwide criminal information connectivity.  Technology provides opportunities to 
collect and share mass amounts of information, but managing and making sense of the data that 
is available is a great challenge.  The development of fusion centers were designed to help 
manage a growing amount of two-way SLT information sharing more effectively and efficiently.  
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 Critical to responding to terrorism and other multi-jurisdictional crimes is local 
information collected from state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies.  This was 
demonstrated in Anarumo’s (2011) survey of law enforcement executives that found significant 
regional differences in the nature of threat groups active in various parts of the country. Further, 
there are documented cases of criminal extremists having routine contact with SLT law 
enforcement officers that led to prevention of an attack (White, 2004), but there have also been 
some missed opportunities, most notably 9/11.  For example, evidence has shown that terrorists 
commit precursor crimes that put them in contact with various law enforcement officers 
(Damphousse & Smith, 2004; Smith et al. 2002; Hamm, 2005).  One concern, however, is that 
potentially relevant and important information is not shared and thus an opportunity to prevent a 
potential serious act may be missed.  The new intelligence structure was designed to fix some of 
these gaps in information sharing.  State, local, and tribal agencies have been urged to develop an 
intelligence capacity so they may effectively share threat information across jurisdictions as well 
as provide information to analysts who may more effectively define the threat picture.  A 
significant challenge, however, is that SLT agencies must absorb the costs of building an 
intelligence capacity as “an unfunded mandate.”  The lack of dedicated resources makes the 
building of an effective intelligence capacity particularly challenging.  
Although the federal government has provided support to build an intelligence 
infrastructure to more effectively respond to terrorism, there has been virtually no empirical 
work that describes the major issues and obstacles faced by SLT law enforcement agencies and 
fusion centers on intelligence-related issues.  This study is a critical first step in documenting the 
status of the progress made accomplishing key intelligence goals, and we believe this study 
contributes to the knowledge of and literature pertaining to intelligence practices in the United 
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States.  In this final section, we discuss three issues.  First, we provide an overview of the key 
findings from the study.  Second, we discuss policy implications.  Third, we highlight limitations 
with this research and suggest future research needs.  
 
KEY FINDINGS 
This article provides an introduction to the information sharing issues faced by American 
law enforcement and empirically explores the extent to which these issues are present among a 
nationally diverse sample of state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies and state fusion 
centers.  We find that significant progress has been made implementing fundamental policy and 
procedures related to building the intelligence capacity of law enforcement and fusion center 
agencies since the attacks of 9/11.  Respondents from both the state, local, tribal law enforcement 
agencies and fusion center samples indicated their agencies were familiar with intelligence 
guidelines and standards, had a good working knowledge of threats in their community, and have 
some working knowledge of intelligence-led policing.  Despite the progress that has been made, 
however, the results also point to significant room for improvement and development.  For 
example, although respondents indicated they were familiar with national standards and 
guidelines, they also expressed the belief that the policies and procedures within their agency 
have yet to align with these requirements.  Similarly, the respondents noted they were aware of 
threats in their jurisdictions, but identified a need to build a capacity to better identify these 
threats and noted shortages in resources and personnel in accomplishing these goals.   
 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
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 The status of law enforcement intelligence in SLT agencies appears to be similar to the 
early development of other innovations in policing, such as community- and problem-oriented 
policing during the early 1990s.  Law enforcement officers and executives recognize the 
importance of intelligence yet the implementation of law enforcement intelligence remains 
inconsistent and largely unknown a decade after 9/11.  Several factors may contribute to this.  
First, the philosophical underpinnings of law enforcement intelligence were significantly 
changed and broadened, hence a resocialization process among intelligence personnel had to 
occur.  At a minimum, such a process includes learning new policies, philosophies, regulations 
and a lexicon of contemporary terminology.  Second, while the 9/11 attacks remain the 
benchmark for change, in reality new standards – such as the National Criminal Intelligence 
Sharing Plan and training programs - did not emerge until 2003.  Moreover, new standards and 
directions continue to evolve even at the time of this writing.  Third, it simply takes time to 
develop new organizations such as fusion centers and get them at an operational level.  Similarly, 
training and developing new policies in America’s roughly 16,000 law enforcement agencies is a 
massive task, particularly when new processes – such as participation in a fusion center – must 
be marketed and sold to agencies as a wise investment in resources.   
Inconsistent development and continued evolution is even more the exception rather than 
the rule when considering the intelligence-led policing philosophy.  Although respondents were 
familiar with the term ILP, the results suggest most agencies are at an early stage of 
implementation.  Indeed, there are different conceptual understandings of ILP and different 
visions of the role ILP should hold in law enforcement organizations.  Like the community 
policing movement, these results reveal clear needs for training, commitment of resources and 
addressing the tension between specialization and generalization.  Additionally, the goal of 
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increasing an intelligence capacity and adopting ILP comes at a time when SLT agencies operate 
under significant budgetary constraints.  Finally, results suggest the potential for fusion centers 
to serve a critical role in the continued development of intelligence capacities within local 
agencies.   
 Although the results of this study point to clear progress with respect to the development 
of law enforcement’s intelligence structure, they also reveal challenges.  Clearly, there is a need 
for the commitment of resources in the form of personnel and training.  Given the fragmented 
and decentralized structure of law enforcement in the U.S., it is critical that mid- to large 
agencies have analysts who can conduct local level analysis as well as push information and 
intelligence to fusion centers.  Small agencies need to have intelligence liaison officers who can 
serve as “nodes” in the intelligence network.  This requires commitment of resources at a time 
when many agencies are not hiring or even cutting personnel.  Law enforcement executives as 
well as policymakers at local, state, and federal levels will need to consider the implications of 
these budgetary issues.  While many executives acknowledge the use of analysts make the 
agency “work smarter”, thereby having a great effect on crime and community order, it remains 
a difficult concept to sell to the public and politicians. 
 Law enforcement executives also need to seriously consider and resolve several issues 
related to specialization and generalization.  At one level is the issue of whether the intelligence 
capacity is viewed as specifically focused on homeland security and the threat of terrorism or 
whether it is viewed as building an “all-crimes, all-hazards” capacity.  On the one hand, the need 
to develop a capacity and expertise focused on terrorism can justify a more specialized focus.  As 
the commander of a local police department intelligence unit told us, “what keeps me awake is 
missing a tip or lead suggesting an Al Qaeda-type attack.”  On the other hand, the results of this 
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study, combined with prior studies, suggest the potential impact of the “all-crimes, all-hazards” 
focus.  Prior research demonstrates the high level involvement of terrorist groups in a variety of 
criminal activity that brings these individuals in contact with SLT agencies (Damphousse & 
Smith, 2004; Smith et al. 2002; Hamm, 2005).  The present study indicates a high proportion of 
suspicious activity reports involving all-crimes.  These results suggest the continued evolution 
and use of SLT law enforcement information sharing networks5, linked to fusion centers and 
federal law enforcement will be best served through the all-crimes, all-hazards information flow.  
Additionally, it strikes us that the costs of the investment in an intelligence capacity will yield 
the greatest benefits for SLT agencies when the capacity equips such agencies to address not 
only terrorism, but a range of criminal threats (e.g., organized crime, gangs, violent crime, 
drugs). 
 A parallel question of specialization and generalization relates to training and 
responsibilities within SLT agencies.  On the basis of these findings, it appears that most 
agencies to date have developed an intelligence capacity through training officers and analysts 
dedicated, or at least focused on, intelligence assignments.  Thus, the respondents to our surveys 
indicate a fairly high level of knowledge and expertise themselves, but report much lower levels 
of familiarity throughout the organization.  Again, this is similar to early stages of community- 
and problem-oriented policing when specialist officers were tasked with implementation, but the 
majority of officers and supervisors focused on so-called “real policing.”  The danger is that the 
intelligence function becomes a specialized function divorced from the larger organization; what 
Toch and Grant (1991) once referred to as an “innovation ghetto.”  The risk is that information 
flow from street-level officers and investigators to analysts does not occur.  Similarly, analysts 
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do not fully understand the needs of officers and investigators.  This, too, suggests the need for 
broad training on the intelligence function, the role of analysts, and ILP.6 
 The development of a national network of 72 fusion centers represents a significant 
undertaking and achievement.  Yet, there has been criticism of fusion centers in two broad areas:  
Fusion center operations (Masse, O’Neil, and Rollins, 2007) and the protection of civil liberties 
(German, Undated).  With respect to operations, there is often a misconception that fusion 
centers are federal entities under the direction of the Department of Homeland Security.  Rather, 
all 72 fusion centers are constituted through state and local government authority with boards of 
directors drawn from the local community.  On the matter of civil liberties, all fusion centers 
have privacy policies and have received extensive training on privacy, civil rights and civil 
liberties.  While fusion center directors feel confident about the civil rights protections in their 
operations, civil libertarians remain skeptical.  
The results of the current study suggest that fusion centers are playing a critical role in 
the nation’s domestic intelligence capacity and could play an even more important role in the 
future.  The co-location of personnel from SLT, federal law enforcement and, in some cases, the 
private sector appears to mitigate some of the historic, cultural, and organizational barriers to 
information sharing.  Consequently, fusion centers occupy an organizational or network “space” 
that is “closer” to both federal law enforcement and the SLTs.  They appear to be a critical 
network “node” for the movement of information and intelligence “up-from” and “back-to” the 
local level.  
 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
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There are two noteworthy trends that have emerged since the data were collected in this 
study.  The first is a maturation of intelligence-related initiatives, which includes policy 
refinements and training that has occurred since the data were collected.7  Second is an 
expansion of the intelligence capacity in agencies that previously did not have one.8   These 
transitions certainly pose significant challenges for a building intelligence capacity as there is a 
steep learning curve for understanding policy issues, civil rights concerns, and information 
sharing opportunities that have to be understood.  However given such circumstances, the 
responses that comprise the present study are thought to be the most valid from the available 
population of key personnel.   
Identifying people who work in the expanding arena of law enforcement intelligence in 
diverse law enforcement agencies is a difficult sampling frame to capture.  Our sample was 
convenient—we were able to obtain email addresses from national training program on 
intelligence issues and from a conference that included fusion center representatives.  Hence, 
while not perfect, the approach taken in this study is perhaps the best available but the 
generalizability of the findings is limited.  Even with the best sampling frame available and a 
robust follow-up the low response rate presented a challenge for the current study.  Although 
multiple efforts were made to contact respondents and encourage participation, it was still 
difficult to increase the response rate.   The length of the survey was certainly an issue as not 
only was there over 100 questions asked, but many of the questions had 20-25 response options.  
In addition, because of the turnover and the fact that multiple personnel were selected from a 
single agency, often a single respondent completed the survey on behalf of the agency.  A major 
concern with the low responses is that it was impossible for us to know whether the 
nonresponses were random as we were unable to document the direction of the response bias.  
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The sample was pulled from email contact lists that did not include any other descriptive 
information.  We do suspect, however, based on the random sample of interviews that we did to 
detect why respondents did not complete the survey, that although the potential for nonresponse 
bias exists that those completing the survey were significantly invested in the intelligence 
practices of their agency.  The motivation to response was to share their knowledge about 
intelligence practices because they were fully engaged in such practices in their agency.   
 
The length of the survey—which contributed to the low response rates--provided us with rich 
context on a wide variety of critical intelligence issues from those actively engaged in those 
issues, and the results, although exploratory, provide an empirical introduction to intelligence 
practices in the United States.   
Although this study provides some keen insights into the status of intelligence practices 
in the United States, it is an exploratory study and there remains a significant need for additional 
research to better understand the transition to integrating intelligence work into strategic and 
tactical decision making.  While previous research has found no evidence to suggest the size of 
an agency helps to explain intelligence practices of the organization (Carter, 2011), further 
research is necessary to more closely examine such a relationship.  More specifically, rather than 
focusing measurement on the size of agency, it is more appropriate to also account for the 
geographic proximity of the agency relative to a major urban area.  Research has found that 
small agencies (fewer than nine sworn officers), that are located in close proximity to major 
urban areas are more likely to have a robust homeland security preparedness capability (Schafer 
et al, 2009).  Related to this issue, there should be a significant commitment to more completely 
examine the work of state and major urban area fusion centers, their relationships with SLT and 
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federal law enforcement agencies, and how to most effectively share information across 
institutions.   
 
 
NOTES 
1. Since many of the changes in law enforcement intelligence did not occur until 2003 or after, 
the true growth of fusion centers did not begin until around 2004-05, it is not surprising that 
there is little scientific research. 
2. Many of these changes are continuing to evolve at the time of this paper. 
3. The National Fusion Center Conference is sponsored by the following agencies: Bureau of 
Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, DOJ’s Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Office of the 
Program Manager, Information Sharing Environment, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms 
and Explosives, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. 
4. As a result of funding requirements, all fusion center criminal intelligence records systems 
follow federal guidelines (28 CFR Part 23) and they must have an approved privacy policy 
that meets the Information Sharing Environment privacy guidelines. 
5. SLT law enforcement networks for intelligence and information sharing are (1) the Regional 
Information Sharing System network (RISS.net); (2) the FBI’s Law Enforcement Online 
(LEO); and (3) the DHS Homeland Security Information Network-Intelligence (HSIN-Intel). 
6. The Global Intelligence Working Group has developed the “Minimum Criminal Intelligence 
Training Standards” which include training guidelines for line level officers. 
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7. The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative is an example. 
8. This is demonstrated in the Bureau of Justice Assistance Targeting Violent Crime Initiative. 
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Table 1. Law Enforcement Sample Descriptives (n = 345) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Median (Mean) 
Agency Size 276 (1341) 
 
 Valid Percent (n) 
Agency Region 
          Northeast 
          Southeast 
          Midwest 
          Southwest 
          West 
 
22% (77) 
23% (80) 
27% (91) 
11% (37) 
17% (60) 
Respondent’s Position 
          Administrator 
          Supervisor 
          Investigator 
          Analyst 
 
29% (100) 
23% (81) 
32% (110) 
16% (54) 
Respondent Years at Agency 
          Less than 1 Year 
          1-3 Years 
          4-9 Years 
          10-15 Years 
          More than 15 Years 
 
.3% (1) 
6% (20) 
18% (64) 
21% (73) 
55% (187)  
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Table 2. Fusion Center Sample Descriptives (n = 96) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Valid Percent(n) 
Focus of Fusion Center  
Terrorism Only 5% (5) 
“All-Crimes” 29% (28) 
“All-Crimes, All-threats, All-Hazards” 52% (50) 
Not Specified 14% (13) 
Age of Fusion Center 
1-3 Years 
4-6 Years 
7 or More Years 
Not Specified 
 
39% (36) 
27% (26) 
17% (16) 
17% (16) 
Respondent’s Position 
          Administrator 
          Supervisor 
          Investigator 
          Analyst 
Not Specified 
 
51% (49) 
20% (19) 
8% (7) 
10% (10) 
11% (11) 
Respondent Years at Fusion Center 
          Less than 1 Year 
          1-3 Years 
          4-9 Years 
          10-15 Years 
          More than 15 Years 
Not Specified 
 
10% (10) 
41% (39) 
27% (26) 
3% (3) 
2%  (2) 
17% (16) 
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Table 3.  Attitudes Towards Agency Preparedness  
Question Fusion Center SLT Administration
5 Supervisor5 Investigator5 Analyst5 
Agency aware 
of  threats1 
 
93.8%* 
(90) 
 
 
63.5% 
(219) 
 
 
6.9% 
(238) 
 
 
63.2% 
(218) 
 
 
57.4% 
(198) 
 
 
70.4% 
(243) 
 
Agency 
prepared for 
threats2 
 
67.7%* 
(65) 
 
 
42.6% 
(147) 
 
 
46.1% 
(159) 
 
 
32.5% 
(112) 
 
 
35.7% 
(123) 
 
 
66.1% 
(228) 
 
Far along is 
agency in 
having an 
intelligence 
capacity3 
 
14.6%* 
(14) 
 
 
9.3% 
(32) 
 
 
 
8.4% 
(29) 
 
 
 
6.7% 
(23) 
 
 
 
7.0% 
(24) 
 
 
 
16.5% 
(57) 
 
Agency has 
sufficient 
staff4 
 
1.0%** 
(1) 
 
 
2.9% 
(10) 
 
 
1.4% 
(5) 
 
 
1.2% 
(4) 
 
 
4.1% 
(14) 
 
 
2.9% 
(10) 
 
Agency has 
capacity to 
identify 
threats4 
 
18.8%* 
(18) 
 
 
13.3% 
(46) 
 
 
14.5% 
(50) 
 
 
16.8% 
(58) 
 
 
7.2% 
(25) 
 
 
18.6% 
(64) 
 
Agency 
provides 
timely intell4 
 
17.7%* 
(17) 
 
 
16.8% 
(58) 
 
 
16.5% 
(57) 
 
 
19.1% 
(66) 
 
 
12.8% 
(44) 
 
 
24.1% 
(83) 
 
Fusion center 
products have 
content to aid 
in prevention 
of crime4 
NA 
 
16.8% 
(58) 
 
 
17.7% 
(61) 
 
 
20.0% 
(69) 
 
 
12.8% 
(44) 
 
 
18.0% 
(62) 
 
1 Very aware/aware; 2 Very prepared/prepared; 3 Very far; 4 Strongly Agree, 5SLT sample 
*.001, **.05 
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Table 4.  Respondent Knowledge of Key Intelligence Mandates 
Question Fusion Center SLT Administrator
3 Supervisor3 Investigator3 Analyst3 
Familiar with 
NCISP1 
 
88.5%* 
(85) 
 
 
64.8% 
(220) 
 
 
65.5% 
(226) 
 
 
57.7% 
(199) 
 
 
68.1% 
(235) 
 
 
60.3% 
(208) 
 
Familiar with 
TCL1 
 
72.9%* 
(70) 
 
 
37.7% 
(130) 
 
 
40.3% 
(139) 
 
 
44.9% 
(155) 
 
 
31.0% 
(107) 
 
 
34.5% 
(119) 
 
Familiar with 
ILP1 
 
86.5%** 
(83) 
 
 
70.4% 
(243) 
 
 
70.4% 
(243) 
 
 
65.5% 
(226) 
 
 
68.1% 
(235) 
 
 
79.1% 
(273) 
 
Agency 
follows 
NCISP recs2 
 
18.8%* 
(18) 
 
 
9.3% 
(32) 
 
 
3.5% 
(12) 
 
 
11.9% 
(41) 
 
 
10.1% 
(35) 
 
 
15.4% 
(53) 
 
Agency 
aligns with 
TCL2 
 
7.3%* 
(7) 
 
 
5.8% 
(20) 
 
 
3.5% 
(12) 
 
 
5.2% 
(18) 
 
 
6.7% 
(23) 
 
 
4.1% 
(14) 
 
1Very familiar/familiar; 2Completely, 3SLT sample 
*.001, **.05 
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Table 5.   Understanding of Intelligence-Led Policing  
Question Fusion Center SLT Administrator
3 Supervisor3 Investigator3 Analyst3 
Agency 
Adopted 
ILP 
 
29.2%** 
(28) 
 
 
18.6% 
(64) 
 
 
16.8% 
(58) 
 
 
11.9% 
(41) 
 
 
20.0% 
(69) 
 
 
26.4% 
(91) 
 
ILP 
effective in 
agency1 
 
37.5% 
(36) 
 
 
28.1% 
(97) 
 
 
20.0% 
(69) 
 
 
24.9% 
(86) 
 
 
39.4% 
(136) 
 
 
33.3% 
(115) 
 
Agency 
chief exec 
supports 
ILP2 
 
51.0%* 
(49) 
 
 
23.1% 
(80) 
 
 
28.1% 
(97) 
 
 
21.2% 
(73) 
 
 
17.4% 
(60) 
 
 
31.6% 
(109) 
 
 
Analysts in 
agency 
familiar 
with ILP2 
 
 
28.1%* 
(27) 
 
 
13.9% 
(48) 
 
 
10.4% 
(36) 
 
 
13.6% 
(47) 
 
 
14.5% 
(50) 
 
 
20.0% 
(69) 
 
Personnel in 
agency 
familiar 
with ILP2* 
18.8%* 
(18) 
3.2% 
(11) 
2.6% 
(9) 
2.6% 
(9) 
3.2% 
(11) 
6.1% 
(21) 
1 Very Effective; 2 Very familiar/familiar, 3SLT sample 
*.001, **.05 
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Table 6.  Consults Other Agencies on Intelligence and Threat Issues 
Agency Fusion Center SLT Administrator1 Supervisor1 Investigator1 Analyst1 
FBI 
 
57.3% 
(55) 
 
 
47.8% 
(165) 
 
 
60.6% 
(209) 
 
 
48.7% 
(168) 
 
 
40.3% 
(139) 
 
 
35.7% 
(123) 
 
State FC 
 
NA 
 
 
45.2% 
(156) 
 
 
50.4% 
(174) 
 
 
40.9% 
(141) 
 
 
39.4% 
(136) 
 
 
50.7% 
(175) 
 
Other State FC 
 
61.5% 
(59) 
 
 
28.7% 
(99) 
 
 
29.0% 
(100) 
 
 
32.2% 
(111) 
 
 
22.6% 
(78) 
 
 
32.8% 
(113) 
 
Other Fed LEA 
 
46.9%* 
(45) 
 
 
42.6% 
(147) 
 
 
47.0% 
(162) 
 
 
40.6% 
(140) 
 
 
42.9% 
(148) 
 
 
34.5% 
(119) 
 
State LEA 
 
60.4% 
(58) 
 
 
53.9% 
(186) 
 
 
56.8% 
(196) 
 
 
54.2% 
(187) 
 
 
52.8% 
(182) 
 
 
50.1% 
(173) 
 
Other Local LEA 
 
56.3% 
(54) 
 
 
59.7% 
(206) 
 
 
64.6% 
(223) 
 
 
60.3% 
(208) 
 
 
57.7% 
(199) 
 
 
52.5% 
(181) 
 
Other Staff in Agency 
 
76.0% 
(73) 
 
 
66.7% 
(230) 
 
 
71.3% 
(246) 
 
 
67.8% 
(234) 
 
 
60.6% 
(209) 
 
 
6.4% 
(22) 
 
Govt Officials 
 
31.3%* 
(30) 
 
 
33.3% 
(115) 
 
 
37.4% 
(129) 
 
 
31.6% 
(109) 
 
28.7% 
(99) 
 
34.5% 
(119) 
 
Govt Attorneys 
 
32.3% 
(31) 
 
 
22.9 
(79) 
 
 
26.1% 
(90) 
 
 
21.2% 
(73) 
 
 
22.0% 
(76) 
 
 
18.6% 
(64) 
 
Experts in Field 
 
63.5%* 
(61) 
 
 
44.9% 
(155) 
 
 
49.0% 
(169) 
 
 
39.1% 
(135) 
 
 
48.4% 
(167) 
 
 
45.5% 
(157) 
 
1SLT sample 
*.001, **.05 
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Table 7.  Satisfaction with Relationships 
Agency Fusion Center SLT Administrator
2 Supervisor2 Investigator2 Analyst2 
 
FBI1 
 
19.8% 
(19) 
 
 
20.6% 
(71) 
 
 
28.7% 
(99) 
 
 
18.3% 
(63) 
 
 
15.7% 
(54) 
 
 
16.8% 
(58) 
 
Other Fed 
LEA 
 
 
18.8% 
(18) 
 
 
16.5% 
(57) 
 
21.7% 
(75) 
 
 
9.0% 
(31) 
 
 
12.5% 
(43) 
 
 
20.0% 
(69) 
 
 
State FC 
 
NA 
 
 
22.3% 
(77) 
 
 
24.1% 
(83) 
 
 
18.8% 
(65) 
 
 
22.0% 
(76) 
 
25.8% 
(89) 
 
State LEA 
34.4% 
(33) 
 
27.8% 
(96) 
 
 
29.9% 
(103) 
 
 
29.0% 
(100) 
 
 
22.0% 
(76) 
 
 
34.8% 
(120) 
 
 
Local LEA 
 
38.5% 
(37) 
 
 
38.0% 
(131) 
 
 
44.3% 
(153) 
 
 
32.8% 
(113) 
 
 
36.5% 
(124) 
 
 
36.8% 
(127) 
 
 
Tribal LEA** 
 
4.2% 
(4) 
 
 
4.9% 
(17) 
 
 
6.1% 
(21) 
 
 
1.2% 
(4) 
 
 
2.6% 
(9) 
 
 
11.0% 
(38) 
 
Private Sector 
 
10.4% 
(10) 
 
 
7.0% 
(24) 
 
 
9.3% 
(32) 
 
 
8.4% 
(29) 
 
 
4.6% 
(16) 
 
 
6.1% 
(21) 
 
Public Health 
 
15.6% 
(15) 
 
 
9.6% 
(33) 
 
 
18.6% 
(64) 
 
 
4.9% 
(17) 
 
 
6.4% 
(22) 
 
 
6.1% 
(21) 
 
Emergency 
Management 
 
22.9% 
(22) 
 
 
17.7% 
(61) 
 
 
29.9% 
(103) 
 
 
9.6% 
(33) 
 
 
14.8% 
(51) 
 
 
11.0% 
(38) 
 
1 Very Satisfied, 2SLT sample 
*.001, **.05 
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Appendix 1.  Survey Questions Organized by Table  
 
Table 3. Attitudes Towards Agency Preparedness  
 
• In your opinion, how aware is your agency of homeland security threats facing your 
region? 
• In your opinion, how prepared is your organization for homeland security threats in your 
region? 
• In your opinion, how far along is your agency in developing and maintaining a criminal 
intelligence capacity? 
• We have a sufficient number of staff to achieve our agency’s intelligence capacity 
mission. 
• Our agency has the capacity to identify the characteristics or events that represent 
indicators and / or precursors of threats. 
• Our agency provides actionable intelligence in a timely manner to those constituents 
responsible for implementing prevention, protection, response and consequence 
management. 
 
Table 4.  Respondent Knowledge of Key Intelligence Mandates 
 
• How familiar are you with the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP)? 
• How familiar are you with the intelligence components of the Department of Homeland 
Security Target Capability List (TCL)? 
• How familiar are you with the Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) concept? 
• Does your agency’s intelligence function follow the NCISP recommendations? 
• Does your agency’s intelligence function align with the TCL? 
 
Table 5.   Understanding of Intelligence-Led Policing  
 
• Has your agency adopted ILP? 
• How effective is ILP in your agency? 
• The chief executive of the agency supports ILP. 
• Most of the analysts in the agency are familiar with the ILP concept. 
• Most of the personnel in this agency are familiar with the ILP concept. 
 
 
Table 6.  Consults Other Agencies on Intelligence and Threat Issues 
 
• What is the likelihood that you will consult representatives from the following agencies 
for questions / concerns about intelligence issues? 
o FBI 
o State Fusion Center 
o Other State Fusion Center 
o Other Federal Law Enforcement Agencies 
o State Law Enforcement Agencies 
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o Other Local Law Enforcement Agencies 
o Other Staff in the Agency 
o Government Officials 
o Government Attorneys 
o Experts in the Field 
 
Table 7.  Satisfaction with Relationships 
 
• How satisfied are you in the relationship you have with the FBI? 
• How satisfied are you in the relationship you have with the other Federal law 
enforcement agencies in your state?  
• How satisfied are you in the relationship you have with the state fusion center? 
• How satisfied are you in the relationship you have with the state law enforcement 
agencies in your state? 
• How satisfied are you in the relationship you have with the other local law enforcement 
agencies in your state? 
• How satisfied are you in the relationship you have with the tribal law enforcement 
agencies in your state? 
• How satisfied are you in the relationship you have with the private sector in your state? 
• How satisfied are you in the relationship you have with the public health officials in your 
state? 
• How satisfied are you in the relationship you have with the emergency management 
personnel in your state? 
 
 
